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Conducting R&D in Countries With Weak Intellectual Property Rights Protection
Abstract
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are increasingly conducting research and development (R&D) in
countries such as China and India, where intellectual property rights (IPR) protection is still far from
adequate. This paper examines this seemingly puzzling situation. I argue that weak IPR leads to low
returns to innovation and underutilization of innovative talents; MNEs that possess alternative
mechanisms for protecting their intellectual properties will therefore find it attractive to conduct R&D at
those locations. A theoretical framework is developed to capture the interaction between firm strategy
and the institutional environment. The empirical analysis on a sample of 1,567 U.S.-headquartered
innovating firms finds results consistent with the hypotheses that (i) technologies developed in countries
with weak IPR protection are used more internally, and (ii) technologies developed by firms with R&D in
weak IPR countries show stronger internal linkages. The results suggest that firms may use internal
organizations to substitute for inadequate external institutions. By doing so, they are able to take
advantage of the arbitrage opportunities presented by the institutional gap across countries.
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Doing R&D in Countries with Weak IPR Protection:
Can Corporate Management Substitute for Legal Institutions?

ABSTRACT
Multinationals are increasingly conducting R&D in countries such as India and
China, where intellectual property rights (IPR) protection is still very weak. This
paper examines this puzzle. The argument is that weak IPR leads to low returns
to innovation and thus low prices of innovative talents. Multinational firms who
possess not only the capabilities to utilize these talents, but also the internal
organizational structures to protect the intellectual properties will therefore find it
attractive to conduct R&D at those locations. Following a series of interviews in
major multinational R&D centers in China, a stylized model of the above is
presented to capture the interaction between firm strategies and institutional
environment. Empirical findings from a sample of 1567 US-headquartered
innovating firms are consistent with the hypotheses that (i) technologies
developed in weak IPR countries are used more internally, and (ii) firms doing
R&D in weak IPR countries have tighter internal technology structures. The
results suggest that firms are using strong internal linkages to substitute for the
inadequate external institutions. And by doing so, they can take advantage of the
arbitrage opportunities presented by the institutional gaps across countries.

Keywords:

R&D, intellectual property rights, multinational firms, arbitrage
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Intellectual property is still an extremely vague concept in China,
where fake DVDs are sold on street corners and even the Government
uses pirated software.

–– The Times (London), Dec. 12, 2002
A significant number of multinationals are increasingly combing the
mainland (China) for engineers and researchers to handle projects for
global applications that, in recent years, would have been performed
in labs in the United States or Europe.

–– ZDNet News, Jul. 10, 2002

I. INTRODUCTION
The recent years have witnessed a surge of multinational R&D activity in countries such
as India and China, where the intellectual property rights (IPR) protection is still far from
satisfactory. Technology giants Microsoft, IBM, Intel, and General Electric are in the
lead, but more firms are following. (Financial Times 4/19/02; New York Times 4/21/02;
ZDNet News 6/10/02; BusinessWeek 2/03/03; Wall Street Journal 7/14/03) Moreover,
the R&D conducted in these Indian and Chinese labs is in excess of that required for
product localization or government-enforced technology transfers.
This trend is in apparent contradiction of conventional wisdom. Because poor
institutional environment erodes the appropriable value of innovation, firms have been
advised to keep their knowledge-intensive activities away from weak IPR countries.
What has enabled some firms to act differently?
To understand this puzzle, I began with a series of interviews in the multinational R&D
labs in China. Some common practices emerged: intensive interactions with headquarters,
patents application in the home country, and internal project transfers across countries.
In particular, the projects are often closely integrated in the multinational firms’ global
research agendas. The “carved-out expertise” – as called by some labs – is valuable only
when combined with the complementary knowledge and resources within the firm. Even
if imitation occurs, the value that can be taken away from the firm is very limited. The
closely-knit internal innovation structure, therefore, serves as an immune system against
the adverse external environment.
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This observation suggests a framework to examine the original puzzle. In countries with
poor IPR protection and poor institutional environment overall, local firms cannot
appropriate value from their intellectual products. As a result, R&D is discouraged and
human capital is undervalued. This is in spite of the fact that these countries have a large
pool of potentially valuable talents to conduct R&D. Multinationals are in a unique
position to arbitrage the difference in factor prices across national borders; their ability to
do so stems from their internal organizations that can be viewed as a substitute for the
inadequate external institutions. I call it the internalization-arbitrage conjecture.
To articulate the idea in a logically traceable way, a stylized model of the above is
presented. It shows that multinationals may find it desirable to conduct R&D across
borders when technologies are complementary internally. By keeping the
complementary resources well protected, multinationals are able to leverage the strong
institutions in the home country for their operations overseas. The viability of this
strategy depends on a set of firm-specific and knowledge-specific characteristics.
The study then seeks empirical evidence of the theoretical conjecture, using US patent
data and the Directory of Corporate Affiliations. I find supportive results that
technologies developed in weak IPR countries are used more internally than those
developed in other foreign countries. In addition, firms doing R&D in weak IPR
countries feature significantly stronger internal linkages than those staying out. The
results are consistent with the thought that the internal linkages allow firms to appropriate
value from their knowledge even under weak institutional environment.
The following section briefly describes the interviews in China. Section III presents a
simple model to show how arbitrage opportunities can emerge from the interaction
between firms and institutions. Section IV brings the theoretical conjecture to the data
and sets up the framework for empirical analysis. The results are analyzed in Section V.
Potential caveats and robustness checks are discussed in Section VI. Section VII
concludes and discusses future extensions.
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II. THE CHINA STORY
Chinese colleges and universities are churning out nearly half a million science and
engineering degrees every year, almost the same size as in the United States. However,
domestic R&D investment remains at a very low level; the still weak enforcement of IPR
protection is often to blame.
In contrast, multinationals are streaming into China to tap the best talents in the country.
By the end of 2002, over four hundred foreign owned R&D centers have been
established, hiring away the best masters and Ph.D.s from China’s top universities and
research institutes. What enable the multinationals to do something that the locals are not
able to do? With this puzzle on mind, I conducted a series of interviews with researchers
and managers in some major multinational R&D labs in Beijing and Shanghai in the
summer of 2002.1 The observations suggest a key role of firms’ internal organizations.

2.1 Organizational Structure
To utilize the human capital and appropriate value from the R&D projects in China,
multinationals have to keep the knowledge leakage at the lowest level possible. At the
same time, China has a booming domestic market. Competition for market shares
requires that multinationals effectively transfer and adapt technologies for their local
operations. This dilemma leads to a common practice among multinational firms in
China: the separation of localization-oriented R&D centers and research labs that aim to
develop frontier technologies for global applications.
During the interviews, it was repeatedly emphasized to me that the research labs are a
coherent part of the firms’ worldwide R&D forces. For example, the goal of Microsoft
Research (MSR) Asia in Beijing is to “attract the most talented researchers in the field of
computing” and to “advance the state-of-the-art in computer science research”. The
mission of IBM China Research Lab (CRL) is to “create world-class information
technologies and the underlying science which propel the world advances”. Intel China
1

Seven of the labs belong to Global 500 companies, and six have more than 100 researchers employed.
Information has been updated through emails and phone calls during the year.
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Software Lab (ICSL) hopes to “create and enhance global value of Intel's silicon,
platforms and solutions by delivering innovative software technology and quality
products”.
With such missions, a research lab is usually a parallel organization outside of the
multinational’s local operations. It reports directly to the technology department at
headquarters, connected with the firm’s other labs by intranet, conference calls, regular
meetings, and project collaborations. Because the resultant technologies are aimed at
global applications, intellectual property issues are mostly handled in the home country.
The centralized organization of these research labs facilitates the transfer of research
projects across locations, and thus makes it possible to exercise the strategy of
differentiated project assignment. Not only do the labs conduct very specific types of
R&D, but also R&D projects at specific stages. For example, once a project gets close to
commercialization, it may be considered “too risky” to stay in China. The firm will
either intensify the monitoring or transfer the project to other locations. In other words,
with the tight internal organization of R&D activities, the firm can make sure that the
R&D activities in China do not expose too much value to risk.

2.2 The Internal Linkages
Unlike those in the localization-oriented R&D centers, people in the research labs do not
seem to be very concerned about imitation risks. When I asked the question: “Given the
weak IPR protection in China, are you concerned that your technology would soon be
stolen?” there are mainly two types of responses:
First, “they don’t have the ability to steal.” Researchers believe that the projects in their
labs draw heavily on the firm-specific expertise, a resource that can only accumulate over
time inside the firm. For instance, the “Personalized Cartoon Generation and Animation”
project in MSR Asia, which later forms the basis of the newest MSN Messenger package,
is a frontier technology building on Microsoft’s strength in computer vision and computer
graphics. In the Intel lab, most efforts are on developing new BIOS, compilers, and
device drivers for Intel architecture platforms. “They are built on Intel technology, and
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they are part of Intel technology,” a team leader said, “Imitation? Not an easy task,
especially if the imitators don’t have the same exposure.”
It is true that copycats do not have to understand the technology before they make copies
of the final products. But very few final products are developed in these Beijing or
Shanghai labs. The research results will be integrated into the final applications
somewhere else, most likely at headquarters. What can be taken away from the research
labs are abstract algorithms, theoretical development, and experiment reports.
Hence there came the second type of answers: “why would they steal?” Intel BOIS, of
course, can only be used on Intel chips. A major success of MSR Asia in 2002 was
“AutoMovie”, a technology that can intelligently generate edited movies from home
videos. It is later integrated in “Microsoft Movie Maker”, which is distributed with the
new Windows operating systems. Similar examples are the “Mobile HTML Optimizer”
used in Microsoft FrontPage, the “Ink Parsing” technology used in Tablet PC, and the
“error-resilient video transmission” technology used in the MPEG4 Standard. These are
all considered major contributions in the field, but they themselves do not bring direct
commercial value to potential imitators. “We don’t count on the legal system for
protection; we count on the technologies to protect themselves,” a researcher told me.
In sum, if technologies inside the firm are highly complementary, the leakage of a
particular technology will not significantly affect firm value. The two types of answers
described above suggest two potential sources of internal complementarity:
Because the generation of these technologies relies heavily on the firms’ internal
expertise, imitation is difficult without the context.
Because the appropriation of these technologies needs the integration with other
internal knowledge and resources, the individual technologies do not bring direct
value to the imitators.

2.3 The Time Trend
Why is this kind of R&D arrangement such a recent phenomenon? First, China –– like
some other weak IPR countries –– has just opened its door to foreign investors. Even
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after the opening up, for a long time the government required minimum local stakes in
foreign invested enterprises, which made close integration almost impossible. In fact,
nearly all these research labs were established after restrictions on wholly owned
subsidiaries were removed.
Another important driving force is the development of information technologies, which
has dramatically reduced the cost of international coordination. Firms need highly
intensive communications to make sure that the components developed in China fit
seamlessly to the needs at the firm level. The efforts have been greatly facilitated by
Internet and the improvement in the local IT infrastructure.
Multinational firms also gained more experience in organizing large-scale R&D projects
and in dealing with the institutional idiosyncrasy in China. “Multinationals are gradually
learning how to move smartly, and some learned their lessons in the hard way,” a
researcher said when referring to the firm’s earlier loss from counterfeits.

III. THE MODEL
The interviews suggest that firms may be able to use their internal organizations to
protect knowledge, hence taking advantage of the inexpensive human capital in weak IPR
countries. In this section I present a simple model to show how technology
complementarities, firm organizations, and legal institutions interact with one another.
This model serves two purposes: to help me study the cross-border arbitrage in a more
structured manner, and to motivate the empirical study in the next section.

3.1 The Nature of Knowledge Diffusion
There are three critical steps in imitation: the motivation to imitate, the ability to imitate,
and the possibility of getting around the legal restrictions against imitation. In an
institutional environment where the legal restrictions barely exist or are not effectively
enforced, the first two factors can play a critical role in firms’ IPR protection. They both
stem from the very nature of knowledge flows.
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First, the motivation to imitate is low when technologies are highly dependent on internal
resources. Imitation is costly (Mansfield et.al. 1981), so it will only happen when
imitators can profit from the technologies. Teece (1986) points out that specialized and
co-specialized complementary assets are critically important to the successful
commercialization of an innovation. Thus, innovators can discourage imitation by
developing technologies that require complementary knowledge not readily available to
potential imitators. For example, basic research that is still far from commercialization,
or technologies that are highly firm specific, are usually less attractive to imitators who
lack the resources to utilize the knowledge.
Second, the acquisition of complementary knowledge is subject to the constraints of
absorptive capacity and geographic distance. It has long been realized that a
multinational corporation is a geographically distributed innovation network, with the
capacity to assimilate, generate and integrate knowledge on a worldwide basis (Bartlett
and Ghoshal, 1990). Knowledge that is difficult to codify or teach can be more
efficiently transferred within the firm (Kogut and Zander, 1993). Therefore, outside
firms have to face much higher costs to obtain complementary knowledge across country
borders, if not altogether impossible.
From this perspective, the nature of knowledge creation and diffusion presents an
opportunity for multinationals to overcome the weak institutional environment in the host
country. On one hand, the internal complementarity of technologies makes the leakage
of individual components less threatening. On the other hand, the constraints on crossborder knowledge flows keep the critical knowledge under the protection of home
institutions. The combination of these two makes R&D in weak IPR countries a feasible
strategy. I will elaborate this idea in the following two-country two-projects model.

3.2 The Model Setup
To focus on the organization of R&D activities, the model assumes away other factors
that may affect the generation and appropriation of intellectual properties. For instance,
large multinational firms, with their worldwide production and marketing networks, are
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in a better position to use new technologies in a large scale and a broad scope (Cohen and
Klepper 1996). They may also enjoy increasing returns to scale in innovation and at the
same time face less financial constraint. These factors are left out of the model. Also for
simplicity, I assume Bertrand competition among identical products, although the
framework applies to more general settings.
Suppose that firm A has two complementary technologies under management: a1 and a2.
Each technology ai (i = 1, 2) has stand-alone value V(ai). For example, Sharp
Corporation’s recent innovation, the Continuous Grain Silicon (CG-Silicon) technology,
provides higher resolution and brightness to compact LCDs. Hence, this technology by
itself has value V(ai), which can be considered the rent that Sharp is able to collect from
LCD manufacturers. Once imitation occurs, Sharp would lose its pricing power on this
technology and V(ai) would plummet to zero.
At the same time, a1 can also be integrated with a2 as complementary technologies inside
the firm. When Sharp combines the CG-Silicon technology with its leading strength in
TFT-LCD, it creates the “smart” displays that make possible a new generation of featurerich portable devices such as Sharp’s Viewcam® digital camcorders and Zaurus® PDAs.
The joint value of two complementary technologies V(a1 + a2), or V(A), is different from
the simple sum of individuals V(a1) + V(a2). Let

δ=

V (a1 ) + V (a 2 )
V (a1 + a 2 )

I argue that δ is less than one for two reasons: First, technologies developed in one firm
may not be readily applicable to other firms who possess a different set of resources. So
the stand-alone value V(ai) can be small due to implementation difficulties. Second, the
innovating firm is in a better position to identify and promote synergy from the pool of
internal technologies, hence enhancing the value beyond the simple sum of individual
components. In the following analysis I will use the phrase “internalized value” to
generally describe the difference between the joint value V(a1 + a2) and the external value
V(a1) + V(a2).
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Note that this is a very general framework. Internal complementarity – hence higher
internalized value – does not have to involve a tangible integration process of concrete
technologies. It may well arise from the corporate culture, routines, or organizational
structure that make a technology more valuable internally than if used by other market
players. Let δ1 = V(a1) /V(A) and δ2 = V(a2) /V(A), then δ1 + δ2 = δ < 1. Note that even
within the same firm, the degree of internal dependence may vary across different types
of knowledge (δ1 ≠ δ2).
Depending on the legal and social institutions, there is certain imitation risk p (0 ≤ p ≤ 1)
in the economy, which is taken as given by individual firms. With probability p,
imitation would happen to technology ai and the stand-alone value V(ai) would be taken
away from the firm. This is independent of what might happen to the other technology.
Only when a1 and a2 are both imitated will firm A lose the whole value V(A).2
An illustration of this scenario is Dupont’s entry into the biotech field. The goal is to
integrate biology with Dupont’s current strengths and bring the production to a higher
level. As Tom Connelly, Dupont’s senior Vice President and Chief Technology Officer
put it, “new opportunities are going to come at the interfaces… For us, Integrated Science
means … bringing on that additional capability and then looking for opportunities where
more than one science comes together.” Sorona®, the latest addition to the polymer
platform, is a successful integration of new biological capabilities with Dupont polymer.
In this example, a1 is the 3GT polymer with many desirable attributes, and a2 is the
biotech method to produce fiber-grade element for the polymer. Even if a1 is imitated,
Dupont can still stay competitive because, so far, the biotech method a2 is the only
commercially viable way to produce a1. The same is true if only a2 is imitated. With the
proprietary 3GT polymer that a2 is designed for, a2 is much more valuable to Dupont than
to any other firms.

2

Even if both technologies are imitated, it is still uncertain whether the imitator can perfectly replicate the
integration process. The development of these technologies involves intensive interaction with each
other and with the firm’s existing expertise, so the synergy is not readily transferable. This factor is
abstracted from the model to make the main theme more traceable. Further analysis shows that although
partial replication can be interesting of its own, omitting it from the model does not change the results.
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On the cost side, each project incurs R&D expense C(ai). Think of C(ai) as the payment
to scientists and engineers who charge market price c for their human capital. The
prevailing market price c is determined by the expected returns from innovation in the
economy: the higher the imitation risk p, the smaller is the value appropriable by the
innovators, and thus the lower is the price of human capital. For individual firms, c is
taken as exogenous. Firms will invest in R&D if and only if the appropriable value is
higher than the costs.

3.3 Multinational R&D

In essence, there are two boundaries in multinational R&D: the firm boundary and the
national boundary. Within a firm boundary, complementary technologies create synergy
in a way that is hard to duplicate outside the firm. Within a national boundary, R&D
activities are subject to certain institutional environment that is distinct from that of other
countries. Multinationals are of particular interest because they expand their firm
boundaries across multiple institutions, and create value from technologies that are
exposed to different external environments.
Suppose there are two countries. Country X has strong IPR protection (small px), hence
high price of human capital (large cx); country Y is just the opposite: large py and small cy.
Firm A can choose where to develop its two complementary projects. It can follow one
of the following three strategies, 3 as shown in Figure 1:
-

Having both projects developed in country X;

-

Having both projects developed in country Y;

-

Having one project developed in country X and the other in country Y.

As specified above, the cost of developing technology ai in country j (j = x or y) is the
amount of human capital used (Hi), times the market price for human capital (cj).

3

Even within one country, firms can choose different organizational structures for their R&D, which in
turn depend on the external environment. For example, R&D by small startups is common in the US,
whereas large and diversified business groups dominate the R&D arena in many Asian countries. These
organizational variances are assumed away in this model so as to highlight the cross-institutional
implications; they will be studied in depth in my future work.

Doing R&D in Countries with Weak IPR Protection

11

In addition, cross border R&D incurs extra coordination and communications costs R
(Kuemmerle, 1997), which is decreasing in the firm’s organizational capability. Let R =
rV(A), where r reflects the organizational cost of the firm, or organizational inefficiency.
Since V(A) is the value – not only the size – of the projects, an implicit assumption here is
that higher synergy would also require higher coordination costs.
National
boundary

Firm
boundary

(i)

(ii)
(iii)

Country X

Country Y

Figure 1. Organizational Strategies of R&D Projects

The expected income from different R&D strategies depends on the value creation as
well as the ability to appropriate the created value. As an example, the following table
shows the risk profile of strategy (iii), in which a1 is developed in country X and a2 is
developed in country Y:
Probability

Value loss

Comments

(1- px) (1- py)

0

No imitation

px (1- py)

V(a1)

Losing the stand-alone value of a1

(1- px) py

V(a2)

Losing the stand-alone value of a2

px py

V(A)

Losing the joint value

So the expected appropriable value is:
V = V(A) – pxV(a1) – pyV(a2) – px py (1– δ) V(A)
Intuitively, V is the created value V(A) minus the expected loss of stand-alone values and
–– if both technologies are imitated –– the internalized value. Throughout this model I
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assume risk neutral decision-making, which is purely for the purpose of simplification.
Taking risk averse into consideration will not qualitatively change the analysis.
Combining V with the total cost
C = C(a1) + C(a2) + R
we get the expected profits
π=V–C
The following table presents the expected profits of all three strategies, equally scaled by
the joint value V(A).
#

Strategy

Return

(i)

Both in country X

π(i) = 1 – px δ – px 2 (1– δ ) – (h1 + h2) cx

(ii)

Both in country Y

π(ii) = 1 – py δ – py 2 (1– δ ) – (h1 + h2) cy

(iii) Each in one country

π(iii) = 1 – px δ1 – py δ2 – px py (1– δ) – h1 cx – h2 cy – r

Here hi = Hi /V(A): the amount of human capital for each unit of value created. Because
human capital can be measured in arbitrary units, I normalize h1 + h2 to 1 in the following
analysis.

3.4 Internalization-Arbitrage

Now we are ready to analyze the potential arbitrage opportunities in strategy (iii),
compared with purely domestic plays (i) and (ii). In strategy (iii), the two
complementary components are developed in two different environments with a
institutional gap ∆p ≡ py – px > 0. The model will show that, given the difference in
factor prices ∆c ≡ cx – cy > 0,4 firms with the right internal capabilities are able to gain
from the cross-border R&D arrangement.
First, why would firm A in country X have the incentive to go abroad and develop a
project in country Y? Take the difference between (iii) and (i):

4

Theoretically, the gap in factor prices will be endogenously affected by firm’s cost arbitrage activities.
But this is beyond the scope of this paper, and should not be consequential unless we are looking into the
very long run. The general equilibrium case will be analyzed in another chapter of my dissertation.
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42444
3 123 {
(1)

( 2)
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(a)

( 3)

In this equation, part (1) is the extra loss due to the additional imitation risk ∆p. It
consists of the potential loss of stand-alone value δ2 as well as the loss of internalized
value (1– δ ). What is intriguing here is that, given ∆p, the loss of internalized value is
reduced if the home country has very strong IPR protection (small px). The reason is that
(1 – δ ) stays within the firm as long as either of the two technologies remains exclusive.
Hence, a strong home institution is critical to the protection of the internalized value.
The interaction between firms and institutions comes into play in the presence of strong
technology complementarity within multinational firms.
Compensating for the extra risks, part (2) is the gain from the inexpensive human capital
in country Y. The cost savings are large if the project developed there needs a large
amount of human capital. Of course, cross-border R&D arrangement incurs the extra
coordination cost r, which has to be justified by the advantage derived from (2) – (1).
Second, why wouldn’t firm A conduct all the R&D in the low cost country? Take the
difference between (iii) and (ii):

π ( iii ) − π ( ii ) = [δ 1 + p y (1 − δ )]⋅ ∆p − h1 ⋅ ∆c − r

14442444
3 123 {
(1)

( 2)

(b)

( 3)

The intuitions behind (b) are similar to those behind (a). Part (1) is the gain from strong
IPR protection in the home country. Since a1 is developed in country X, the stand-alone
value δ1 is better protected and the internalized value (1 – δ ) is also subject to smaller
imitation risks. The worse the IPR protection in the host country (large py), the more
advantageous it is to be multinational. For purely domestic firms in country Y, even the
internalized value is hard to protect because both complementary components are subject
to the same weak IPR.
However, having a1 developed in country X also means higher cost of human capital.
Part (2) reflects the cost disadvantage compared with purely domestic firms in country Y.
The extra coordination cost r may also undo the gains from (1) – (2), and therefore
discourage cross-border R&D.
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Equations (a) and (b) explicitly point out the potential arbitrage opportunities in
multinational R&D activities. The cross-border arrangement would be a desirable choice
if π(iii) > π(ii) and π(iii) > π(i) hold simultaneously, i.e.,
⎧⎪ π (iii ) − π ( i ) = −[δ 2 + p x (1 − δ )] ⋅ ∆p + h2 ⋅ ∆c − r > 0
⎨ ( iii )
⎪⎩π − π ( ii ) = [δ 1 + p y (1 − δ )] ⋅ ∆p − h1 ⋅ ∆c − r > 0

Rearrange the terms:
⎧(− δ 2 ⋅ ∆p + h2 ⋅ ∆c ) − p x (1 − δ ) ⋅ ∆p − r > 0
⎨
⎩ (δ 1 ⋅ ∆p − h1 ⋅ ∆c ) + p y (1 − δ ) ⋅ ∆p − r > 0

(a' )
(b' )

Given ∆p and ∆c, (a’) and (b’) can hold simultaneously if:
(1) The project developed in country Y takes a large amount of human capital h2 so that
the cost savings are large, but it has limited stand-alone value δ2 so that the potential
risks are small. Meanwhile, the project developed in country X has a high stand-alone
value δ1, but it requires relatively small amount of human capital h1.
(2) The imitation risk px is low so that having one project developed in country Y brings
little damage to the internalized value (1 – δ). Meanwhile, the imitation risk py is
high so that keeping one project in country X is critical to the protection of (1 – δ).
(3) The organizational cost r is reasonably low.
The three components are not mutually independent. For example, the organizational
cost affects the R&D structure endogenously chosen by the firm, and the feature of
individual components affect the overall degree of internalization. However, the model
provides me a logically traceable framework to examine the original puzzle. Essentially,
firms can strategically use their internal organizations to arbitrage the institutional gap
across countries, which I call the internalization-arbitrage mechanism.

3.5 Insights from the Model

We were faced with a puzzle: why do multinationals conduct R&D in countries with
weak IPR protection? The answer involves an opportunity, and the ability to catch the
opportunity.
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Due to the poor IPR protection in some countries, local talents cannot realize value from
their innovative activities. Human capital is underpriced as a result. Such low cost
human capital is attractive to R&D intensive firms if they possess alternative mechanisms
to protect their intellectual property. One of the mechanisms, as identified above, is the
internal complementarity of technologies.
First, R&D projects that are heavily reliant on internal complementarities are less
appealing to imitators. This enables firms to conduct R&D in weak IPR countries
without exposing themselves to too much risk. For example, software module
development in India and product-based technical solutions in China are very human
capital intensive, but the value of these technologies is highly dependent on the
multinationals’ internal R&D architectures. In contrast, projects developed in the home
country, such as system designs or core products, tend to be more valuable on their own.
The strategy of differentiated project assignment, in essence, is to tailor the projects so
that the firm can capitalize on the strengths of particular locations while minimizing the
costs or risks.
Exercising this strategy, however, is not as straightforward as it seems. Depending on the
technology field and the firm’s organizational structure, it can be a challenge to carve out
the right projects for weak IPR countries. Usually in the IT industry, R&D projects are
easier to decompose than in the traditional industries, where the lack of a comprehensive
knowledge base in the host country would significantly affect R&D efficiency and thus
compromise the cost savings.
Second, multinationals, by keeping the key components under a strong IPR regime, are in
a unique position to protect the internalized value arising from internal
complementarities. The tighter their internal knowledge structures are, the more
advantage they have compared with purely domestic firms in the host country.
The multilingual technology on computer systems is a good example of the internalized
value. Because of the non-alphabetical nature of Chinese characters, Chinese software
companies have been developing multilingual editors and related products since the early
1980s. They failed one after another due to prevailing piracies. At the same time,
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Microsoft, IBM, and Intel are actively developing multilingual technologies in China.
The resulting achievements have significantly increased the international appeal of their
products ranging from office applications to communication devices; the value-added is
evidenced by their ever-increasing investment in this field.
In this example, the value appropriation is not reliant on the small stand-alone value of
specific components. Most local firms realize the value of multilingual technologies and
are able to integrate the technologies in their own products. What makes the difference is
the inimitable component in the joint value: Intel chips, IBM business solutions, and
Microsoft software packages marketed in the strong IPR countries. While local firms
have to face prevailing piracy and slim profit for their products, multinationals can realize
the value of these innovations in the global market, where intellectual products are well
protected and rewarded.
The example shows that internal complementarity can take on very general forms. The
complementary component can be a technology, a firm-specific expertise, or simply the
access to IPR-friendly markets. Firms can appropriate the value from R&D as long as the
complementary components are not subject to the same high risks.
Of course, only those with sufficient organizational capabilities will find it worthwhile to
set up R&D facilities in a foreign country, not to mention a country with very different
institutional environment. The organizational capabilities can differ widely across firms,
depending on the firms’ previous exposure to institutional idiosyncrasies, their
experience in utilizing foreign technologies and resources, and the established routines of
intra-firm knowledge transfers.

IV. EMPIRICAL DESIGN

The interviews and anecdotal stories are supportive of the internalization-arbitrage
conjecture, but they are silent on how general the phenomenon is. In this step I bring the
ideas to the data and construct empirical measures to capture the theoretical concepts.
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4.1 Implications of Internalization-Arbitrage

The key insight that emerges from the qualitative analysis is the substitution of firm’s
internal capabilities for the poor external environment. A multinational firm can take
advantage of the inexpensive human capital in weak IPR countries if the value of the
technologies can only be appropriated inside the firm, and if the firm can efficiently
coordinate cross-border R&D activities.
Let γk be the measure of internal linkages for technology k, which is owned by firm i and
developed in country j. According to the internalization-arbitrage conjecture, γk should
depend on (1) the external IPR environment under which k is developed, (2) the
characteristics of the firm that develops the technology. Within each firm, γk is expected
to be higher if k is developed in a country with weak IPR protection. Across firms, firms
that are able to conduct R&D in weak IPR countries are expected to have a higher γk for
all the technologies they develop, everything else being equal. This lends a natural
framework to the empirical analysis.
First, I focus on firms that conduct R&D in countries with weak IPR protection and
examine the strategies they use: how do firms arbitrage? If firms strategically allocate
their R&D projects in response to the external environment, as suggested by the
theoretical analysis, then we should be able to observe systematic differences among
technologies developed under different IPR regimes. Specifically, technologies
developed in weak IPR countries should have stronger internal linkages, controlling for
firm characteristics.
Second, I compare across firms and examine firm capabilities: who are doing the
arbitrage? Internalization-arbitrage is a viable strategy only for firms with the right
internal capabilities to defy the adverse environment in the host countries. Hence, we
should be able to observe systematic differences between firms that do R&D in weak IPR
countries and those that stay away. Specifically, firms who are able to do so should
feature tighter organization of their innovative activities and more efficient coordination
across countries.
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These tests entail the following tasks:
Define “weak IPR countries” using a series of widely cited indices;
Describe the data sources and the sample;
Construct variables from sample data to capture the theoretical concepts;
Identify the right econometric model for the empirical analysis.
I will address the four tasks in detail in the next four subsections.

4.2 Defining Weak IPR Countries

Arbitrage opportunities exist when a country has a substantial reserve of human capital,
yet suffers from weak IPR protection. Referring to the World Development Indicators, I
remove countries and areas that have less than two million population, less than 1% of
gross tertiary school enrollment rate, or less than five patents filed with USPTO in the
whole 1990s. The removed countries and areas are, for example, Belize, Trinidad, and
most sub-Sahara African countries. The reason for the screening is that the small size of
human capital reserves will not justify the entry cost of multinationals. Although a
handful of inventors do reside in these countries, they are very likely to represent extreme
cases. Including these data may cause biases rather than adding explanatory powers. For
the same reason, I remove war-torn countries such as Croatia, Cuba, and Yugoslavia.
Six indices are considered to measure the institutional environment for IPR protection;
they reflect different aspects of institutional environment and have been widely used in
literature. The time horizons covered by these indices do not exactly coincide with each
other. But given the slow changes in institutions, these indices should be indicative of
the IPR protection levels in these countries.
The first three indices apply to the general legal and political environment:
The Law and Order index in the ICRG Risk Rating System (1993-97). The index is
formed using public sources such as newspaper reports published in the country in
question, national and international news services, reports of national, regional and
trans-regional banks and other institutions, and international organizations such as
OECD, BIS, IMF, and the World Bank.
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The O-Factor in the PricewaterhouseCoopers Opacity Survey (2000). Opacity is “the
lack of clear, accurate, formal, easily discernible, and widely accepted practices.” The
potential for opacity exists in five principal areas: corruption in government, the laws
governing contracts or property rights, economic policies, accounting standards, and
business regulations. A high degree of opacity in any of these categories will expose
the appropriable value of R&D to higher risks.
The Property Protection index in the Index of Economic Freedom (1995) by the
Heritage Foundation. It mainly tracks seven aspects of property rights protection: the
commercial code defining contracts, sanctioning of foreign arbitration of contract
disputes, government expropriation of property, corruption within the judiciary, delays
in receiving judicial decisions, and legally granted and protected private property.
The second set of indices apply specifically to intellectual property rights protection:
Rapp and Rozek (1990) index: This index reflects the conformity of national patent
laws with the minimum standards proposed by the United States Chamber of
Commerce. It covers about 97 countries, and pertains to the situation in the mid-80s.
Out-of-date as it is, researchers and businesses are still using it as a reference to gauge
the IPR environment of the host countries.
Ginarte and Park (1997) index: This frequently cited index was produced for five-year
intervals starting with 1960 and ending in 1995. I use the data covering the most recent
period: 1990-95. The index rates the national patent protection system according to
five categories: the extent of coverage, membership in international treaties, provisions
for loss of protection, enforcement mechanism, and duration of protection.
United States Trade Representative’s Special 301 watch list and priority watch list
(1999). On the lists are “trading partners that deny adequate and effective protection of
intellectual property or deny fair and equitable market access to United States artists
and industries that rely upon intellectual property protection.” Although these lists may
be biased for political reasons, it is relevant to this study because I am studying the
behaviors of American firms, who would probably refer to the government
announcements before making their investment decisions.
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I also supplement the indices with the Political Constraints measure developed by the
Rule of Law index developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón (1999, 2002), and
the piracy index developed by the International Planning and Research Corporation (IRC)
on behalf of the Business Software Alliance (BSA) and the Software & Information
Industrial Association (SIIA).
These indices turn out to be quite consistent. Whether I use each single index, or a
composite index with various weights, I get a very stable list of 34 countries with weak
IPR protection. The country names and the corresponding indices are listed in Table 1A
in the Appendix. Interestingly, this list is not restricted to low-income regions. The per
capita Gross National Income ranges from US$25,920 for Hong Kong (China) to US$440
for Pakistan in 2000, according to the World Bank statistics.

4.3 Data

Despite the various criticisms on patent data, I choose to use the US patent data for the
following reasons (in addition to Griliches 1990; Patel and Pavitt 1995):
First, to meet the criteria for patenting, a technology has to be novel, non-obvious, and
useful. Multinationals would only file US patents for frontier technologies that have
potential value in the home country. With patent data instead of R&D expenditures, I can
eliminate the localization/adaptation type of R&D specific to the host countries, and
instead focus on overseas innovations that can bring value to the whole firm – the home
base augmentation kind of R&D as defined in Kuemmerle (1999). Moreover, because
patents are the output of R&D, I can capture the projects that fruitfully utilize human
capital in the weak IPR countries.
Second, patent citation is so far the most traceable evidence of knowledge flows (Jaffe,
Trajtenberg and Fogarty 2000). The systematic documentation of patent citations tracks
the knowledge flows within and across the firms’ global innovation networks. From
forward patent citations, I can identify who are following up the innovations, when, and
where.
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Finally, the detailed location information for all the patent inventors can help me identify
the geographic distribution of talents utilized by American firms. Since the inventors’
mailing addresses (not permanent addresses) are required in the patent application, they
should reliably reflect the actual locations of the innovations.
Information on patents granted between January 1993 and December 1999 is obtained
from the NBER patent data. Patents granted between 2000 and August 2003 are
analyzed using the weekly Grant Red Book V2.5 bibliographic data from USPTO. Each
entry field is closely examined to ensure consistency when the two data sets are merged.
Admittedly, the usual caveats apply: not all innovations obtain patents, and not all
knowledge flows are reflected in patent citations. Casual observations suggest that most
R&D results in weak IPR countries are not patentable. In addition, a significant
proportion of citations are imposed by patent examiners rather than by the applicants
themselves. It would be unlikely that those imposed citations represent learning. I will
analyze these problems in depth in the robustness check.
Since patents may be assigned to subsidiaries or parent companies for unobservable
reasons, I study each multi-unit firm as an integrated strategic agent. The Directory of
Corporate Affiliation (DCA) database published by Lexis-Nexis traces corporate linkages
of more than 174,000 parent companies, affiliates, subsidiaries, and divisions worldwide.
It allows me to build family trees for each firm in my sample. By an American firm I
mean an ultimate parent registered in the United States, plus all its subsidiaries and
affiliates, home or abroad, that are owned by the same ultimate parent, directly or
indirectly, by more than 10%.5 After aggregation, the number of firms in my sample is
only half of the number of assignees.
Compustat data are used to capture other firm level information, such as industry
classification, size, etc. To avoid noises from small or instable firms, I drop companies
with less than $0.1 million assets, as well as those that are active for less than three years.

5

This is the official criterion of FDI for US companies. I will vary this number in the robustness check and
make sure that the ownership threshold does not affect the result.
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It is true that using Compustat data limits the study to the publicly traded companies, but
it also eliminates the incomparability issue between public and private firms, as these two
types of firms are subject to very different operational constraints. Given the fact public
firms hold the majority of US patents (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2001), they should be
representative of the innovating firms.

4.4 The Sample

I decide to focus on US-headquartered firms in the empirical study. The reason is that I
can obtain the most complete data for US firms, and at the same time avoid the potential
administrative biases in cross-country comparisons.
The sample period is from 1993 to 2001, and I study all the patents that are applied
during this period (granted up to August 2003). The reason why I do not include more
recent years is that there is a typical 2-year time lag between patent application and patent
granting. Using the most recently applied patents will bias the sample toward the
selection of “quick patents”. At the same time, R&D in weak IPR countries is still a very
recent phenomenon. Extending the sample period further back will not add much value
to the analysis either. As robustness check, I also examine this sub-period from 1993 to
1997 in order to stay away from the irrational expansion during the Internet Bubble.
Different industries vary widely in their propensity to patent and the usefulness of patents
as the indication of innovative activities (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh 2000). The industry
control variables can only partly alleviate the problem. To reduce unrelated noises, I
eliminate the industries where patents are very weak indicator of innovations until very
recent years (e.g., insurance), industries that are heavily influenced by public policies
(e.g., utility), industries that are domestic by nature (e.g., retailing), or industries whose
geographic locations are dictated by some exogenous effects (e.g., mining). The main
sample includes the following 2-digit SIC industries: 28 (chemical and allied products),
29 (petroleum and coal products), 30-39 (manufacturing), 48 (communications), 73
(business services, including software), and 87 (engineering and management services). I
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shall vary the industry selection in the robustness check and make sure that our findings
do not depend on specific industries.
The challenge in the data preparation is to match the major datasets together, where the
only link among them is the company names. A computer program6 is developed to
match the records together by company names. I decide not to use the Compustat match
offered in the NBER patent data, which uses 1989 Compustat data. Instead, matching is
conducted year by year to accommodate possible name changes –– which are not unusual
during this period. The program has been carefully tested and all the results are manually
checked. Any ambiguous matches are verified using information from Dun & Bradstreet,
company websites, as well as industry publications.
Patents assignees are first matched with the companies in the DCA file. Then the patent
information is aggregated at the ultimate parent level according to the affiliation
information from DCA. Accordingly, annual financial data for the American parents are
obtained from the Compustat files and then matched with the consolidated patent files.
When mapping multiple years together, I carefully checked the possible changes in
company names, database coding, mergers and acquisitions, etc., to ensure consistency.
I drop those companies that have zero patent output during the entire sample period and
those 3-digit SIC industries that contain less than three innovating firms. After data
cleaning, the main sample contains 1567 firms in 92 three-digit SIC industries, whose
patent output during the eight-year period ranges from one to over twenty thousand
(IBM), averaging at more than one hundred per firm. Among these firms, 681 firms
register positive utilization of foreign inventors while only 227 of them use inventors
from weak IPR countries.
From the data sources I can construct a rich set of variables for the empirical analysis.
The key variables include the geographic distribution of a firm’s innovations, and the
internal linkages among those innovations.

6
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Doing R&D in Countries with Weak IPR Protection

24

4.5 Locations of Innovation

Empirical studies often take the country of the first author as the location of an invention,
partly because this information is readily available in the NBER patent data. However,
given my focus on human capital utilization, I want to be very careful about the possible
distortion. In a patent with multiple inventors, which is often the case in cross-border
R&D projects, an inventor from a developing country is likely to be the second, third, or
15th coauthor in the sequence. The first authors’ location may therefore bias against the
involvement of foreign inventors, particularly those from developing countries.
To verify the possible bias, I track the addresses of all the inventors whose names are
listed on the patent applications, and weigh the contribution of each inventor by his/her
sequence in the inventor list7. Then, for every patent, I calculate the percentage
contribution from different countries. Comparison between the first-author rule and the
weighted-contribution rule confirms my thought that inventors in weak IPR countries are
more likely to be collaborating with inventors from other countries, and they are more
likely be at the tail of the inventor sequences.
In the following analysis,
If more than half of the inventors are from weak IPR countries, then the patent is
considered to be developed in weak IPR countries;
If more than half of the inventors are from the US, then this patent is considered to be
developed in the home country; and
The rest are technologies developed in other (strong IPR) foreign countries.
The 236,850 patents in the full sample are described in Table 1. Small as it is, the share
of patents developed by American firms in weak IPR countries has been steadily
increasing over the last decade.
Accordingly, a firm is considered to have R&D in weak IPR countries if at least one of its
patents is developed in those countries. The firm is considered to have foreign R&D if at
least one of its patents is developed in a foreign country. I will vary the classification
7

There are no absolute rules as to the weighting. Basically, the weight is higher for inventors listed at the
beginning of the sequence, and higher for inventors in a smaller team.
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criteria to check the robustness of my results. Table 2 gives a glance to the 1567 firms
included in the sample.

4.6 Internal Linkages

There is no direct measure for internalized value, but value can be proxied by usage.
Technologies whose values are highly dependent on other internal resources are more
likely to be utilized within the firm boundaries. Since “citations to patents that belong to
the same firm” represent mostly internalized knowledge transfers (Hall, Jaffe and
Trajtenberg 2001), I will use self-citations to proxy for the internalized value of each
technology. Presumably, the more a patent is cited by the same firm (forward self
citations), the more its value is being retained inside the firm boundary.
Note that my measure of “self-citation” differs from that of Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg
(2001) in two important aspects, which lead to higher self-citation ratios in this study:
First, HJT uses the patent assignee code as their unit of analysis. They acknowledge that
“the same firm may appear in different patent documents under various, slightly different
names”, hence assuming different assignee codes. For example, “Dell USA Corporation”
and “Dell USA, L.P.” were treated as two different firms. To avoid this problem, the
assignees in my sample are all matched to the DCA data of the corresponding year to
make sure that every firm is unique and identifiable.
Second, HJT treats every assignee as an independent entity. Affiliates or subsidiaries of
the same firm will be given their own assignee codes and hence will show up as unrelated
with the parent company or with one another. Because I am more interested in the firm
as an integrated organization, any citation that occurs within the same firm boundary is
considered a self-citation. For example, a citation from IBM Japan, Ltd. to a patent
owned by the IBM in New York State would be counted as self-citation in this study, but
would not be the case in HJT.
Similar to HJT, my citation calculation is subject to the truncation problem in the time
series. The patents filed within the 1993-2001 sample period had only received a fraction
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of the citations by the end of August 2003. However, I believe that this problem will not
significantly affect my results, as patents in the same firm are likely to be affected
similarly and I will certainly control for the between-group variations in my analysis.
Even if there are significant within-group variations in citation lags, my measure will
only favor those technologies that are cited by the same-firm patents faster. This is
consistent with my objective to capture the efficiency in internal knowledge utilization:
speed as well as scale.

V. MODEL AND RESULTS

So far I have obtained a rich set of variables to capture the theoretical concepts in the
model. In this section I seek empirical support for the internalization-arbitrage conjecture
by analyzing the within- and across-firm variations in technology structures.

5.1 Econometric Model

Let Nk be the number of citations received by technology k, among which nk are selfcitations. nk, which proxies for internal linkages and falls within the interval [0, Nk],
depends on (1) the external IPR environment, (2) the internal firm characteristics.
I choose the zero-inflated negative binomial model to reflect three features of the data:
First, most patents only received a small number of citations during the short sample
period. A continuous measure such as self-citation ratio would be hard to justify where a
large proportion of the observations are 0’s and 1’s. Second, negative binomial is
preferred to a simple Poisson model due to the large variance in the number of received
citations. Third, zero self-citations may arise from a different mechanism. Because
many patents have yet to receive any citations till the end of the sample period, nk = 0
does not necessarily mean a low level of internalization. It may simply be constrained by
the fact that Nk = 0.
In the first step, I control for firm effect and study the within-firm variance. The
regression takes the following form:
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Pr(nk) = f (weak, foreign, i.firm)
with inflate (Nk) exposure (Nk) cluster (nclass)
where
weak is the dummy variable to indicate whether the technology is developed in a
weak IPR country.
foreign is the dummy variable to indicate whether the technology is developed in a
foreign country. Hence, foreign must be 1 if weak = 1.
i.firm is a series of dummies variables to control for firm fixed effects.
inflation (Nk) specifies that the total number of citations Nk may cause the observed
count nk to be zero. exposure (Nk) specifies Nk as the maximum scope in which selfcitations nk can be observed for each observation.
cluster (nclass) specifies that the observations are independent across patent classes
but not necessarily within the classes. A generalized correlation matrix may be
needed for the regression.
The coefficient on variable foreign is expected to be negative. Previous studies have
found that knowledge diffusion is geographically concentrated in nature (Almeida 1996,
Jaffe and Trajtenberg 1998). Therefore, I expect that the foreign developed patents are
less intertwined with the parent company’s knowledge base.
Meanwhile, I expect a positive coefficient on the variable weak. The purpose of R&D in
weak IPR countries is to appropriate the inexpensive human capital, and knowledge
internalization is used as a barrier against imitation. Hence, the demand for internal
linkages would be stronger in countries with weak external institutions.
The strong internal linkages may be due to the fact that firms allocate the intrinsically
more internalized technologies in weak IPR countries. Alternatively, the firms may be
developing similar technologies at multiple locations, but with different organizational
structures. Both cases are consistent with the theoretical conjecture. Although a control
for technology fields is not necessary from the theoretical perspective, it would be
interesting to see empirically whether it is the type of technologies that is driving the
differences.
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In the second step, I compare across firms and examine whether firms doing R&D in
weak IPR countries manifest stronger internal linkages. The regression takes the
following form:
Pr(nk) = f (weak, foreign, size, f_weak, f_foreign)
with inflate (Nk) exposure (Nk) cluster (nclass)
where
weak and foreign are defined as above.
size is the firm’s average assets or sales during the sample period. Alternatively, I
also use total number of patents, and the logarithm of these variables, to proxy for
firm size. Large firms, presumably, are more likely to see both ends of a citation
falling within the firm boundary.
f _weak and f _foreign are two dummy variables to indicate whether the firm that
developed patent k has any R&D in weak IPR countries or any foreign countries.
The reason why the technology-specific variables weak and foreign remain in the
regression is that R&D locations significantly affect the degree of internalization. It
would be hard to compare across firms without controlling for the location differences.
For example, a patent developed by an American firm in Germany would be hardly
comparable to a patent developed by an American firm in the US. By controlling for the
location effect, I am able to examine whether, among technologies developed under
similar environment, a firm’s R&D presence in weak IPR countries is associated with
stronger internalization of its technologies.
According to the discussion in previous sections, firms need to have strong organizational
capabilities to successfully implement R&D internalization, even more so for R&D in
weak IPR countries. Therefore, I expect positive coefficients on both variables f _weak
and f _foreign.
Again, the difference in internal linkages may arise from firms’ heterogeneous
organizational capabilities. It may also arise from the particular technology fields that the
firms are involved in. I cannot precisely tell these two cases apart, as the technology
fields may be endogenously chosen by firms with different capabilities. For the purpose
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of this study, it is sufficient to identify the relationship between a firm’s internal
knowledge structure and its multinational R&D strategies.
In both models, the marginal effect (economic significance) of the variables can be
calculated as follows:
∂E (nk ) N k E (nk )
=
⋅ βi
∂xi
Nk

Because the key independent variables are 0-1 dummies, the coefficients can be roughly
interpreted as the change in self-citation ratio if the dummy changes from 0 to 1.

5.2 Within Firms: Differentiated Project Assignment

In this step I look into the 227 firms that conduct R&D in weak IPR countries, and
compare the technologies developed under different IPR regimes. Table 3 gives the selfcitation ratios for three groups of patents: those developed in weak IPR countries, those
developed in strong IPR foreign countries, and those developed in the home country
(U.S.). As expected, the first group consistently shows higher self-citation ratios than the
second, highlighting the effect of external environment.
The regression results are shown in Table 4. Column (1) is the base model run on the
whole sample. With the truncated data, self-citation ratio is increasing over time because
inventors tend to cite the same-firm patents faster. In column (2) I repeat the same
regression with eight year-dummies to remove the time effect. Replacing the yeardummies with a trend variable t generates similar results.
In column (3), I only include firms that have more than 50 patents over the nine-year
period. The purpose is to make sure that the results are not driven by misrepresentative
observations in small firms. Since the theoretical conjecture is on firms’ internal
complementarities, those above certain R&D scales should be the more appropriate group
to study.
Statistics show that over half of the US patent citations are imposed by examiners, rather
than being submitted by inventors or patent attorneys in their patent applications (Alcacer
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and Gittelman, 2003).8 Although inventors may fail to cite the prior arts for various
reasons, it would be far-fetched to interpret the examiner-imposed citations as knowledge
flows. Luckily, the distinction between inventor-filed and examiner-imposed citations is
now available for patents granted after 2000. Therefore in column (4), I conduct the test
using only inventor-filed citations made by post-2000 patents.
In the theoretical analysis, I argue that the viability of this strategy may vary widely
across industries. When the R&D needs substantial support from the local knowledge
base, the low wages may be compromised by low efficiencies. It would be interesting to
examine whether the internalization-arbitrage conjecture holds not only in aggregate, but
also in particular technology fields. Column (5) reports the results for patents in the
“Computers and Communications” field, as defined by Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg
(2001). It contains 35 primary US patent classes spanning communications, computer
hardware & software, computer peripherals, and information storages. Separate tests are
also conducted in other categories.
As shown in Table 4, throughout the specifications the coefficient on the foreign dummy
is significantly negative, which indicates distance effect. Marginal effect calculation
shows that within the same firm, foreign developed patents are 20-30% less likely to be
cited by the same firm, compared with those developed in the home country. The
difference is even larger in the IT industry and pharmaceutical industry.
However, the positive coefficient on the weak dummy nearly offset all the negative
distance effect. This is not trivial if we believe that the weak IPR countries are even
further away from the home country in terms of culture, institutions, and technological
development. The net effect of weak and foreign indicates that technologies developed in
weak IPR countries are intertwined in the firms’ internal knowledge base as if they were
right at US headquarters!
It may be the case that the large proportion of self-citations is not due to firms’ strategic
project assignment, but to the development level of the host countries. Generally, the
weak IPR countries are also the less developed countries. Innovators in those countries
8
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have to rely heavily on the knowledge base of the parent companies and produce very
firm-specific intellectual properties. However, this interpretation is still consistent with
the theoretical argument. Multinationals provide the knowledge base necessarily to
develop the new technologies effectively, which cannot be easily obtained otherwise by
the local talents. As a result, the generated technologies are less likely to be utilized
outside of the firm boundaries.

5.3 Across Firms: Organizational Structure

In this step I look across firms and examine firm capabilities. Do firms that conduct
R&D in weak IPR countries systematically differ from other firms in their internal
organization? Table 5 gives the average self-citation ratios for three groups of firms:
those with positive patent output in weak IPR countries, those with positive patent output
in foreign (but not weak IPR) countries, and those whose R&D is in the home country
(U.S.) only. Statistics for large R&D firms are also shown in the table. Consistently,
firms with R&D in weak IPR countries show much higher self-citation ratios on average.
The regression results are shown in Table 6. Column (1) and (2) are the base model run
on the whole sample, with and without time effect. In column (3), I control for patent
classes9 to test whether the difference in internal linkages are driven by different
technology fields that the firms are engaged in. Same as in the within-firm analysis,
column (4) removes examiner-imposed citations and focuses on citations received after
2000, while column (5) gives a glimpse of the results for specific technology fields.
Across all specifications, the coefficients on f _weak and f _foreign are positive and
significant. The results show that firms who are able to conduct R&D overseas generally
have more internalized technology structures compared with purely domestic firms. In
addition, among firms with foreign R&D, those who are able to do R&D in weak IPR
countries manifest even stronger internal linkages. The location effects are controlled
throughout the analysis.
9

The reported result uses the 3-digit US primary patent classes. Aware of the caveats with this
classification, I also used the International Patent Classes (IPC) on a sub-sample and obtained
qualitatively similar results.
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Arguably, firms with R&D in weak IPR countries have proportionally more self-citations
simply because they are larger. Although this is consistent with my theory10, I would like
to examine more closely whether the degree of internalization is fully explained by firm
size. In Table 7 I report the regression results with controls of assets (1), the logarithm of
assets (2), annual sales (3), and the total number of patents owned by the firm (4).
Surprisingly, assets and sales both show up with negative coefficients. That is, among
firms that do R&D in foreign/weak IPR countries, larger size is associated with even
weaker internal linkages, although the marginal effect is very small. Meanwhile, the
coefficients on f _weak and f _foreign remain positive and significant. A large patent
pool does offer some explanation power to the high level of self-citations, but the
economic significance is, on average, less than 1% of the f _weak and f _foreign dummies.
Therefore, the data provide supportive evidence that firms with R&D in weak IPR
countries feature stronger internal linkages, even after controlling for firm sizes.

VI. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS

In this section I discuss the caveats in the above analysis and carry out a series of
robustness tests to make sure that the results do not depend on the specific setups.

Bias in Using Patent Data

Without a direct measure for knowledge creation and knowledge flows, there are
potential measurement biases in the empirical test:
I hope to test whether technologies developed in weak IPR countries are more
internalized than technologies developed elsewhere. But instead we can only observe
whether patents developed in weak IPR countries receive higher self-citations.
I hope to test whether firms that do R&D in weak IPR countries have more
internalized innovation structures. But instead we can only observe whether firms
that have patents from weak IPR countries are more internalized.
10

Optimally, firms expand until the organizational costs go beyond the benefit of internalization. In that
sense, firm size itself reflects organizational capabilities.
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With different patent propensity across firms and across countries, I need to examine to
which extent the unobservable part of the R&D activities would affect my result.
Firms file patents so that they can “exclude others from making, using, or selling the
technology in the United States” (USPTO), and claim credit from whoever uses it. Given
the nontrivial cost involved in patent applications, firm will only patent a technology if it
expects potential uses of the technology by other firms. Moreover, the results of many
R&D activities, such as program coding and laboratory tests, are not patentable at all.
These activities also tend to be the most firm specific. Therefore, the non-patented
technologies should be more internalized than the patented ones. As a result, self-citation
ratios calculated from the patent data would underestimate the overall internal linkages of
R&D activities.
Conversations with managers and engineers in the China labs suggest that most R&D
efforts there are not in the patent-oriented category. Only a small proportion of the
technologies with the highest outside value will be patented in the US. If non-patentable
R&D is more common in the weak IPR countries – which seems to be the case according
to observations – then the estimation of internal linkages is biased downward by a larger
extent in weak IPR countries than in other countries. If anything, this sample bias goes
against my findings and should make the results even more significant. The same logic
applies to the analysis of firms.

Biases in Measuring Self-Citations

Due to the organizational changes over the years, the self-citation counts may be biased
upward or downward. For example, after firm A was acquired by firm B, A as a firm no
longer exists. As a result, any citation from the post-acquisition firm B to the prior arts
assigned to A would not be counted as self-citations, even if the citing and cited patents
may involve exactly the same team of inventors. On the other hand, if a team in firm A
worked on a project up to the acquisition date and the resultant patent is assigned to the
post-acquisition firm B, then citations to the prior arts owned by B would be counted as
self-citation, although they hardly represent within-firm knowledge flows.
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To avoid these biases, I eliminate from the sample any assignees that changed firm
affiliation during the sample period. Also eliminated are firms that substantially changed
their names, although the affiliation numbers remain the same. This decreased the
number of firms in my sample to 1054.
The same within-firm and across-firm regressions are conducted on the reduced sample,
and the results from the base model are reported in Table 8. Compared with the base
model in Table 4 and Table 6, the reduced sample with stable firm affiliations produces
even stronger within- and across-firm differences. Controlling for firm effect,
technologies developed in weak IPR countries are 25% more likely to be cited internally
than those developed in other foreign countries. Controlling for R&D locations, firms
with R&D in weak IPR countries have roughly 43% higher self-citation ratios than firms
that only engage in R&D in strong IPR countries, and 74% higher than purely domestic
firms.

Alternative Measure of Internal Linkages

There are many aspects of internal linkages for an organization, and the self-citation
measure is at best an imperfect proxy. The internalization-arbitrage argument would be
more convincing the same pattern can be found with alternative measures.
One measure that has been developed for this purpose is R&D collaboration across
geographic locations (Lahiri 2003). Presumably, having researchers from different
countries collaborate on the same project not only signals the firm’s strong coordination
capabilities, but also facilitates future knowledge flows within the firm.
Again, I follow the same procedures of within- and across-firm analysis.
Suppose in each firm, there are Kc patents involving inventors from a particular country
c, among which kc are collaborated work with inventors from other countries. Then the
ratio kc/Kc captures the linkages between the inventors in the country c subsidiary and
other parts of the firm. Focusing on firms with R&D in weak IPR countries, I find that
on average, 62% of the patents involving inventors from weak IPR countries are
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collaborated, versus 44% for patents involving inventors from other foreign countries.
Among patents that are developed at the same location, say, the strong IPR foreign
countries, the kc/Kc ratio is 44% for firms conducting R&D in weak IPR countries, and is
37% for firms staying away.
This calculation, therefore, confirms the thought that technologies developed in weak IPR
countries feature stronger internal linkages, and that the firms tapping talents in weak IPR
countries consistently have stronger internal linkages overall.

VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE EXTENSIONS

Doing R&D in countries with weak IPR protection seems contradictory to the
comparative advantage theory. Because of the poor institutional environment, these
countries are not known for their R&D or technology strengths. This paper argues that
multinational firms can substitute their internal innovation organizations for the external
environment. Firms with closely-knit internal technology structures are able to take
advantage of the undervalued human capital in these countries without exposing
themselves to too much risk.
This adds to our understanding of a fundamental question in international strategy.
Traditional views focus on firm-specific assets (intangibles, etc.) or location-specific
endowment (natural resource, etc.) as the driving forces of internationalization. More
recently, Ghemawat (2003) advocates that the foundation for international strategy
should be built on the arbitraging of international differences, strategies made possible by
internal firm capabilities. This study is a direct illustration of this point: institutional gaps
across countries can be an important source of arbitrage opportunities. The study also
reveals the internal capabilities required to take advantage of the opportunities. Just as
globalization is not for everybody, neither is setting up R&D centers in China or India.
To benefit from R&D internationalization, a firm’s infrastructure matters.
While identifying the potential opportunities in adverse institutional environment, I am
by no means indicating that poor IPR protection is good either for firms or for the
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economy. In face of weak legal institutions, firms strategically internalize their
knowledge-intensive activities. As a result, even if the quantity of foreign R&D may not
be significantly affected by patent protection (Kumar 2001), the nature of R&D varies
widely, as evidenced by this study. In particular, a multinational firm would only carry
out specific types of R&D in weak IPR countries, and only firms with strong
organizational capabilities would choose to do so. In other words, internalizationarbitrage is multinational firms’ strategic choice under the constraint of poor external
environment. Removing this constraint is expected to alter both the channel and the
direction of knowledge flows. For example, multinationals would feel comfortable
bringing technologies that are more readily applicable to the host countries. Indeed,
Branstetter, Fisman and Foley (2002) show that U.S. multinational firms responded to
IPR reforms in the host country with more technology transfers to the subsidiaries.
For policy makers, this study points out that firms are not passive policy takers.
Multinational firms can leverage one country’s institutional environment for their
operations in other countries; and public policies in one country may have spillover
effects on the effectiveness of other countries’ policies. The interactions between firm
strategies and institutional changes have to be analyzed in a global context.
This study also opens a whole line of further researches.
First, it would be interesting to take the current analysis to a dynamic setting. R&D
internalization and R&D in weak IPR countries have both grown rapidly in the recent
several years. What are the fundamental changes that have magnified this arbitrageinternalization effect? Are these changes happening in corporate management or in the
external environment? Or both? Or one is the repercussion of the other?
Second, even among firms that do R&D in weak IPR countries, I have observed a large
variation in R&D organizations across firms and across industries. How is this related to
firm performance? Is this dependent on the leader/follower positions of individual firms?
Answering these questions entails in-depth study to disentangle the multiple forces
underlying the variation.
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Finally, the arbitrage-internalization mechanism should not be limited to innovation only.
This thinking – using internal capability to substitute for inadequate social and legal
institution – can also be found in the mainstream internalization theories (e.g., in Buckley
and Casson, 1976) and in the line of work on “business groups” (Khanna 2000).
Although the intangibility of knowledge makes R&D the ideal sector for institutional
arbitrage, we have reason to believe that the mechanism applies to other sectors too. A
study with a boarder view would surely deepen our understanding of firms and
institutions.
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Table 1. Description of Sample Patents

Year

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Total

Patents developed in
weak IPR countries

Patents developed in all
foreign countries

Number

Percentage

Number

Percentage

118
209
251
278
385
386
505
437
267
2,836

0.60%
0.98%
0.81%
0.95%
1.12%
1.22%
1.70%
1.79%
1.75%
1.20%

2,070
2,219
6,651
4,387
3,406
3,203
3,332
2,982
1,820
30,070

10.53%
10.41%
21.41%
14.94%
9.91%
10.10%
11.21%
12.20%
11.94%
12.70%

Total number of
patents

19,652
21,313
31,061
29,371
34,357
31,708
29,716
24,434
15,238
236,850

Table 2. Description of the Sample Firms

Variables
Assets (million dollars)
Sales (million dollars)
Number of patents
Number of subsidiaries
Number of assignees
Countries with presence
H-index for tech class

Firms that do R&D
in weak IPR
in any foreign
countries
countries
(227 obs)
(681 obs)
10414.65
8088.27
750.14
45.69
4.98
13.56
0.08

4981.98
3813.81
298.60
31.99
3.34
8.92
0.12

All Firms
(1567 obs)
2687.09
1931.97
137.61
19.36
2.27
4.55
0.28
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Table 3. Self-Citation Ratios of Patents Developed under Different Environment

Year

Patents developed in weak
IPR countries

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Average

mean
0.133
0.167
0.187
0.198
0.181
0.189
0.236
0.399
0.686
0.200

s.d.
0.191
0.252
0.267
0.302
0.295
0.314
0.377
0.472
0.464
0.312

Patents developed in other
foreign countries

mean
0.129
0.130
0.117
0.109
0.140
0.179
0.216
0.251
0.315
0.164

s.d.
0.228
0.232
0.231
0.237
0.277
0.330
0.360
0.398
0.449
0.301

Patents developed in the
home country

mean
0.083
0.076
0.070
0.078
0.101
0.166
0.212
0.365
0.396
0.224

s.d.
0.198
0.192
0.180
0.215
0.247
0.324
0.357
0.453
0.455
0.324

Table 4. Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Regression on Within-Firm Difference
Without Year
Dummy
(1)

With Year
Dummy
(2)

Firms with >50
patents
(3)

Excluding
examiners'
(4)

Computer &
Telecom
(5)

Weak IPR country

0.2201***
(0.0429)

0.2055***
(0.0425)

0.2033***
(0.0426)

0.2128***
(0.0566)

0.3941***
(0.0659)

Foreign country

-0.2851***
(0.0152)

-0.2838***
(0.0150)

-0.2838***
(0.0151)

-0.2248***
(0.0217)

-0.4496***
(0.0303)

Const

-1.6529***
(0.0595)

-1.6743***
(0.0599)

-1.6755***
(0.0600)

-1.9263***
(0.1093)

-0.6564***
(0.6398)

Total citation

- exposure

Inflate
Total citation

0.0131***
(0.0011)

0.01181***
(0.0012)

0.01180***
(0.0022)

0.0883***
(0.0078)

0.0178***
(0.0022)

Const

-2.4702***
(0.0484)

-2.4389***
(0.0497)

-2.4405***
(0.0498)

-2.9442***
(0.1213)

-3.2100***
(0.1309)

Obs
log_likelihood
LR chi2
Prob > chi2

125796
-153830.20
22600.59

125796
-153479.8
23301.52

125036
-153106.1
22799.91

95302
-66659.79
14710.83

42801
-52536.13
7282.7

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Doing R&D in Countries with Weak IPR Protection

Table 5. Self-Citation Ratios of Patents Developed by Different Firms
Firms with positive patent output
in the 10-year period

Year

Firms with >50 patents
in the 10-year period
w/o R&D in
w/ R&D in weak w/ R&D in other w/o any foreign w/ R&D in weak
weak IPR
IPR countries foreign countries
R&D
IPR countries
countries

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Average

0.175
0.180
0.163
0.195
0.219
0.249
0.294
0.340
0.410
0.211

0.129
0.130
0.117
0.109
0.140
0.179
0.216
0.251
0.315
0.144

0.083
0.076
0.070
0.078
0.101
0.166
0.212
0.365
0.396
0.125

0.180
0.185
0.167
0.201
0.226
0.254
0.299
0.347
0.408
0.216

0.129
0.109
0.134
0.105
0.164
0.185
0.281
0.273
0.348
0.153

Table 6. Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Regression on Cross-Firm Difference
Without Year
Dummy
(1)

With Year
Dummy
(2)

Control for
patent classes
(3)

Excluding
examiners'
(4)

Computer &
Telecom
(5)

Firm w/ R&D in
weak IPR

0.3991***
(0.0127)

0.3950***
(0.0125)

0.3239***
(0.0126)

0.5337***
(0.0191)

0.5256***
(0.0249)

Firms w/ R&D in
foreign

0.2644***
(0.0290)
0.0808*
(0.0467)
-0.4077***
(0.0146)
-2.0770***
(0.0272)
- exposure

0.3196***
(0.0285)
0.0390
(0.0456)
-0.3811***
(0.0144)
-2.2373***
(0.0286)

0.3112***
(0.0284)
0.2002***
(0.0438)
-0.4605***
(0.0143)
-2.5436***
(0.4744)

0.1016**
(0.0403)
0.0573
(0.0585)
-0.2753***
(0.0206)
-2.8044***
(0.0446)

0.7188***
(0.0652)
0.4846***
(0.0683)
-0.6570***
(0.0282)
-3.0136***
(0.0650)

0.0119***
(0.0009)
-2.0326***
(0.0455)

0.0102***
(0.0010)
-2.0344***
(0.0492)

0.0097***
(0.0009)
-1.9433***
(0.0409)

0.0830***
(0.0052)
-1.9950***
(0.0778)

0.0145***
(0.0019)
-2.7041***
(0.1306)

Developed in
weak IPR
Developed in
foreign
Const
Total citation
inflate
Total citation
Const
Obs
log_likelihood
LR chi2
Prob > chi2

153950
-192640.3
2180.04
0.00

153950
-191527.2
4406.28
0.00

153950
-186562.4
14335.92
0.00

116138
-83201.8
5538.83
0.00

49733
-62134.3
2044.86
0.00
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Table 7. Cross-Firm Regression with Size Effect

Assets ($BN)

Control for
Assets
(1)
-0.0020***
(0.0001)

Control for Log
of Assets
(2)

Control for
Sales
(3)

Control for
Patent Output
(4)

-0.0219***
(0.0034)

Log_Assets

-0.0024***
(0.0002)

Sales ($BN)

0.0120***
(0.0007)

Patent Output
(thousand)
Firms w/ R&D 0.4761***
in weak IPR
(0.0141)

0.2323***
(0.0165)

0.4788***
(0.0142)

0.1095***
(0.0146)

Firms w/ R&D 0.3415***
in foreign
(0.0326)

0.2878***
(0.0338)

0.3422***
(0.0326)

0.2756***
(0.0302)

Developed in
weak IPR

0.0340
(0.0471)

0.0672
(0.0476)

0.0410
(0.0471)

0.0980*
(0.0473)

Developed in
foreign

-0.3655***
(0.0154)

-0.3718***
(0.0154)

-0.3686***
(0.0154)

-0.4043***
(0.0151)

-2.2574***
(0.0326)
- exposure

-2.9459***
(0.0902)

-2.2638***
(0.0326)

-3.1274***
(0.0827)

Total citation

0.0089***
(0.0012)

0.0107***
(0.0012)

0.0088***
(0.0012)

0.0135***
(0.0012)

Const

-2.1412***
(0.0326)

-2.2904***
(0.0589)

-2.1321***
(0.0578)

-2.5187***
(0.0696)

Const
Total citation
inflate

Obs
log_likelihood
LR chi2
Prob > chi2

126636
-160355.5
3766.21
0.00

125672
-159688.5
3357.86
0.00

126636
-160369.4
3738.43
0.00

137626
-167770.0
7726.48
0.00
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Table 8. Within- and Cross-Firm Regression with Stable Firm Affiliations
Within-firm
(1)

Across-firm
(2)

Firms w/ R&D
in weak IPR

0.4309*** (0.0136)

Firms w/ R&D
in foreign

0.3115*** (0.0314)

Developed in
weak IPR

0.2543*** (0.0437)

0.0826*

Developed in
foreign

-0.3034*** (0.0159)

-0.4131*** (0.0152)

Const

-1.6456*** (0.1396)

-2.2466*** (0.0315)

Total citation

- exposure

(0.0471)

inflate
Total citation

0.0105*** (0.0014)

0.0095*** (0.0012)

Const

-2.5555*** (0.0589)

-2.1863*** (0.0610)

Obs
log_likelihood
LR chi2
Prob > chi2

106365
-130730
20209.91
0.00

129614
-162695.3
3855.15
0.00
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APPENDIX A. Countries of Weak IPR Protections
Scientist Population Tertiary Opacity Property Law & Rapp Ginarte USTR's
&Enginee (millions)
School
Factor Rights Order and & Park Special
rs/million
1995 93-95 Rozek 1990
30111
(gross %) 2000
1999
people
Argentina
Belarus
Brazil
Bulgaria

711

35.22

41.80

2,296

10.30

44.00

168

161.52

11.70

1,289

8.36

41.20

60.60

2

4.58

1

3
60.85

3

3.25

1

370

14.42

30.30

35.65

1

459

1215.30

5.70

87.16

4

1

3

3

70.81

2

533

3.40

33.10

1,317

10.32

22.70

Egypt
Greece
HK, China
Hungary
India
Indonesia

0.24

1.0

-1.08

1.0

-0.09

58
58

-0.22

China
Czech Rep.

1.85

1.5

3

Chile
Costa Rica

2.26

KKZ Piracy
Index Rate
1998 2000

4.58

2

2.41
1.47

1.0

1.26

49

2.0

-0.22

94

1.0

0.88

1.0

0.62

43

493

59.27

22.60

57.97

4

3.61

2

1.99

1.5

0.17

1,045

10.48

42.80

57.38

2

5.56

4

2.32

1.5

0.66

5.36

1.73

57

1.0

0.78

51

93

6.32

28.00

44.68

1

1,249

10.19

25.10

50.07

2

2.57

66

158

945.78

6.90

63.74

3

3.83

1

1.48

1.5

0.21

63

..

197.18

11.30

75.16

3

4.22

0

0.33

1.5

-0.97

89

Israel

1,570

5.69

43.60

52.71

2

5.00

5

3.57

1.5

1.09

41

Korea, Rep.

2,139

45.51

60.30

73.46

1

5.00

3

3.94

1.0

0.82

56

Lithuania

2,031

3.71

31.40

58.45

Malaysia

154

21.14

11.40

Mexico

213

92.71

16.10

47.64

Pakistan
Peru
Philippines

4.61
3.00

3

2.37
1.63

1.0

0.82

66

-0.38

56

78

125.42

3.40

61.96

2

2.64

1.99

1.0

-0.71

23.95

31.10

57.63

3

2.83

1

1.02

1.5

-0.44

3

3.78

4

2.67

63.93

3

156

71.90

35.20

1,460

38.62

24.30

Portugal

1,583

9.93

38.00

Romania

1,393

22.61

22.50

71.42

Russia

3,397

147.73

41.40

83.59

Slovak Rep.

1,706

5.35

22.10

Spain

2
2

229

Poland

South Africa

0.19

992

39.90

18.80

1,562

39.27

51.10

1.0

-0.04

61

1.0

0.57

54

1.31

42

4

1.0

-0.25

3

1.5

-0.78

2

5.42

3

1.98

2
59.54

61

88

0.13

3

3.33

5

3.57

1.0

0.21

45

2

6.00

4

2.95

1.0

1.35

51

Taiwan (CN)

660

21.42

18.71

60.64

1

5.00

1.0

1.17

53

Thailand

102

60.00

20.90

66.95

1

5.00

1

1.85

1.0

0.40

79

Turkey

303

61.45

18.20

74.07

2

4.17

1

1.80

1.5

0.19

63

2,121

51.11

41.50

1.5

-0.76

194

22.31

25.40

63.45

3

4.00

2

1.35

1.0

-0.62

58

4,103

265.23

80.60

35.53

1

6.00

.

4.52

.

1.77

26

Ukraine
Venezuela
United States

11

4

The countries with a “1” are countries on the watch list, those with a “1.5” are on the priority watch list,
and those with a “2.0” are section 306 monitoring countries.
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APPENDIX B. Illustration of Data Sources

COMPUSTAT (1993-2001)
– Assets, Sales, R&D, SIC, etc.
Key: CNUM

(1)

Listed U.S. firms

DCA (1993-2001)
– Subsidiaries, Foreign Entries, etc.

Firm i

Key: NUM
Parent i

Sub i1 Sub i2

(2)

Sub i3

NBER patent data ( granted 1993-1997)
Patent –– Assignee – Company name

(6)

Patent Class

↔ Firm key #

(For Every Application Year
1993-2001)

Backward Citations

(3)

Patent key #

Forward Citations

Self citations

Inventor Information

IPR environment
Technology characteristics

USPTO Red Book (granted 1998-2003)

Firm characteristics

CONAME CD
Patent –– Assignee – Company name
Patent Class

(4)

Backward Citations

Forward Citations
Inventor Information

Country Indices (various years)

(5)

IPR Protection

Inventor
cited
Examiner
imposed

(7)
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Notes:
Dotted rectangular: data sources
Rounded rectangular: processed datasets
Dashed lines: data matching
Solid lines: information reference
Steps
(1)

Match COMPUSTAT with DCA data, year by year, according to company names.

(2)

For each matched firm, extract all the family members from DCA.

(3)

Prepare data for patents applied on or after 1993, and granted between 1993 and
1997, using the NBER dataset.

(4)

Prepare data for patents applied on or after 1993, and granted between 1998 and
mid-2003, using the USPTO data. Assignee names are modified according to the
USPTO company name files.

(5)

Country indices are used to describe the countries of the inventors.

(6)

Patent assignee names are matched with all the company names –parents as well as
subsidiaries and other family members –in the COMPUSTAT-DCA company list.
Thus, every patent (with relevant information) is corresponding to a firm (with
relevant information). Inventor locations are used to determine the IPR
environment in which the technology is developed. Self-citations are used to proxy
for internal linkages.

(7)

Among the self-citations from (6), count the number of self-citations imposed by
the examiner. Exclude those citations in the robustness check.

